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Abstract 
Offshore wind megaprojects in European waters have significant carbon abatement potential and 
increasing their number is a policy goal for several European maritime nations. But experience has 
shown that governance of large-scale, commercial offshore wind development is not straight-
forward. It is found that in five EU Member States, policy innovation intended to enable investment 
in offshore wind projects is leading to a convergence upon a distinctive European model of offshore 
wind governance. The European Union appears to play numerous roles in this process and further 
research into how offshore wind policy innovation propagates in the EU is warranted. 
Policy relevance 
The governance of offshore wind megaproject development places specific demands on several 
areas of policy. This article firstly provides an account of recent developments in how offshore wind 
governance functions in some of the most important offshore wind nations. Secondly, the discussion 
of the EU’s role in shaping offshore wind governance will inform future debates about the proper 
role of the EU in enabling offshore wind investment. Thirdly, the fact that policy appears to be 
converging raises questions about how policy is transmitted between EU Member States, the 
answers to which could be valuable to policymakers looking at other areas of energy governance. 
Finally, the observed trend of increasing centralisation of decision making should be of interest to 
policymakers mindful of the role of scale and decentralisation in debates about energy governance. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted that renewable energy technologies have an important role to play in 
decarbonising the energy sector and tackling climate change (IPCC, 2014; Mitchell et al., 2011; IEA, 
2015a). In several European countries, the pursuit of the Continent’s offshore wind resource is a 
stated policy goal, not least due to the apparently wide-open spaces of the sea and the avoidance of 
some of the problems of acceptance generated by onshore wind (Twidell & Gaudiosi, 2009; 
Ladenburg & Dubgaard, 2007).  
But, in the same way that Henry Ford’s customers could have a car in any colour (as long as it was 
black), offshore wind projects only come in one size: extra-large; offshore wind turbines are the 
largest rotating machines in history (Beurskens, 2011). A sector able to deliver the offshore wind 
megaprojects1 that have become the norm in Europe (EWEA, 2015; Anzinger & Kostka, 2015) does 
not happen by accident. Bringing an offshore wind sector into being has involved public policy 
choices in numerous areas including research and innovation, industrial policy, skills and 
infrastructure such as ports (BIS, 2013; Wieczorek et al., 2013; Fitch-Roy, 2013). This article focuses 
on the public policy decisions which directly impact offshore wind project development. 
Demonstrating compliance with relevant social and environmental requirements of regulation and 
law, connecting the plant to the electricity transmission system and ensuring sufficient revenue to 
raise finance are all vital parts of the project development process. In all European countries seeking 
exploit their offshore wind resource, development and installation of offshore wind farms is carried 
out within a framework of wide-ranging pre-existing and targeted legislation and regulations.  
The governance2 of offshore wind project development is distinct from that of other, land-based 
renewable energy technologies in two important ways. Firstly, the spatial planning implications of 
the marine environment impact on the legal nature, allocation and complexity of the rights and 
responsibilities of actors involved (Osherenko, 2007; Young, 2002). Secondly, nearly all elements of 
offshore wind construction are subject to greater risk and uncertainty that onshore renewables - in 
part due to the status of scientific evidence of impact and partly due to the relative immaturity of 
the technology (Leary & Esteban, 2009) – but also the sheer scale of projects and the capital 
committed to preparing a project for construction. The objective of this article is to demonstrate 
that the approach taken to the governance of offshore wind development in five EU countries is 
converging or becoming more similar over time (Kerr, 1983) and to reveal the nature and extent of 
the convergence.  
Since the first commercial offshore wind farm was installed in Denmark in 1992, the policy and 
regulatory frameworks that govern offshore wind development have evolved in all European 
offshore wind nations. Until recently approaches among European Member States were diverse with 
little or no commonality (Wieczorek et al., 2013).  
                                                          
1 Flyvberg (2014) provides a useful definition of mega project as “large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost US$1 
billion or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are 
transformational, and impact millions of people” 
2 Defined here as the policies and regulations that govern the interaction between offshore wind project developers and 
the various national, local and non-governmental bodies involved in establishing a large-scale, commercial offshore wind 
farm. 
3 
Explanations for this diversity could explore, inter alia, the industrial history that shaped the existing 
institutions, legislation and regulations (Toke et al., 2008) or political economic explanations such as 
varieties of capitalism (e.g. Hall & Soskice, 2001b). This article surveys innovation in the governance 
of offshore wind development in Europe to determine whether it is leading to convergence between 
Member States’ approaches over time and role of the European Union (EU) in that convergence. 
Innovation is defined here as distinct from policy invention and therefore includes approaches or 
ideas that are new to a particular Member State even if they have been implemented before 
elsewhere (Berry & Berry, 2007; Walker, 1969).  
Energy policy making in the EU, perhaps especially renewable energy policy, is conducted 
simultaneously at the national and European level. Many of the properties of offshore wind such as 
its scale and potential role in connecting the transmission systems of nations sharing sea-borders 
mean that it is an intrinsically transnational policy area which demands coordination between 
national approaches (Schillings et al., 2012). At a time when there is a concerted effort within the EU 
institutions to create a European ‘Energy Union’ as a powerful integrative force with clear benefits 
for climate policy (Buzek, 2015), understanding the ways in which energy policy innovations diffuse 
within the EU is especially important. 
In addition to an account of recent developments in offshore wind governance in some of the most 
important offshore wind nations, this article analyses the nature and extent of convergence 
between national approaches. It highlights and discusses some of the mechanisms which may drive 
convergence including, crucially, the role of EU policy which in itself is no guarantee of national 
convergence (Dimitrova & Steunenberg, 2000). The article also comments on the nature of the 
governance model on which EU offshore wind nations are converging and its coherence with wider 
trends in climate and energy policy. 
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2. Approach to analysis 
The analysis considers two main areas of offshore wind governance, marine resource management 
and economic governance. Developing an offshore wind farm has the potential to impact on society 
and the environment (Haggett, 2008; Portman et al., 2009; Bergström et al., 2014). The legislation 
and regulations that manage these impacts tend to be complex (Salter, 2008; Wright, 2014; Leary & 
Esteban, 2009) and the industrialisation of the oceans has led to a rethinking of marine governance 
(see Salcido, 2008; Wright, 2014; Osherenko, 2007). Central to this marine governance is the 
management and regulation of marine resources such as marine renewable energy including the 
allocation of seabed tenure and the processes by which development rights are issued. 
In addition to marine resource management, there are two areas of economic governance essential 
for the development of offshore wind farms. First is the question of how wind farms’ connections to 
the onshore electricity transmission system are organised and paid for (Meeus et al., 2012; Meeus, 
2014). Second is the nature of the financial settlement available to the project owner. 
Four elements of offshore wind governance are used as the basis of this comparison: 
1. The allocation of seabed tenure; 
2. The granting of development rights; 
3. The responsibility for connection of offshore power plants to onshore transmission; 
4. The design of and approach to financial settlement. 
 
Seabed tenure 
Models for allocating seabed tenure3 occupy a spectrum between two opposing extremes: 
 
1. An ‘open-door’ approach in which companies promoting an offshore wind project indicate a 
site4 on which they propose to build an offshore wind farm for consideration by appropriate 
authorities; 
 
2. A ‘defined-site’ allocation in which the government or one of its agents identifies a site 
which is then allocated by the State to a company or companies exclusively for the 
construction of an offshore wind farm. 
 
Between these two extremes is an approach in which state authorities offer an offshore wind ‘zone’ 
or zones for the construction of a single wind farm with a degree of freedom over the final location 
and detailed design. Such rights are often but not always provided in conjunction with “development 
rights” described below. 
Development rights 
Obtaining permission to develop an offshore wind farm is generally more complex than for onshore 
renewables (Toke, 2011). Much of this complexity arises from the number of public agencies from 
                                                          
3 Although ‘tenure’ might not strictly be issued more the 12 nautical miles from a nation’s sea coast, where the bulk of 
offshore wind megaprojects are built, the rights to allow occupation of the seabed in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
reside with the nation’s government under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 
4 With potential inappropriate sites and areas excluded in a process of Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) 
5 
which permits must be obtained or to which legal compliance must be demonstrated (Snyder & 
Kaiser, 2009). The other area of complexity is the requirement to undertake environmental studies 
and consult with various statutory and other stakeholders as part of the conditions of many offshore 
permits (Gray et al., 2005). Consequently, there are two main ways in which this targeted reform 
may be implemented: i) by limiting the number of public agents from which permits must be 
obtained and ii) by limiting the public consultation or the data collection the developer must 
undertake.  
Grid connection 
Meeus (2014) usefully identifies three distinct models for connecting offshore renewable energy 
projects to the grid (see also Green & Vasilakos, 2011): 
 
1. A ‘Transmission System Operator (TSO) model’ in which responsibility for extending the 
transmission grid to accommodate offshore connections is performed by the TSO but 
responsibility to connect to the offshore transmission system remains with the project 
owner; 
2. A ‘generator model’ in which responsibility to connect to the onshore system lies with 
the wind farm owner; and 
3. A ‘third party model’ in which a (regulated) third party is responsible for the connection 
between the generator and the onshore system. 
  
In European offshore wind nations, electricity consumers ultimately pay for the connection of 
offshore wind to the transmission system and any required upgrades to the onshore system. 
Nevertheless, the mechanism by which the costs are recouped is significant. The cost of building and 
operating a connection to the onshore grid may be recouped through a TSO levy across all its users 
(generators and consumers) or a direct charge on the connected wind farm. The onshore grid 
upgrades required may be similarly charged to the developer or ‘socialised’ across all users. 
Financial settlement 
Policy-makers have numerous design options available when considering how to support renewable 
energy investment and there is a copious literature produced over the last two decades discussing 
the merits of and problems with a wide range of models (see Mitchell et al., 2006; del Río & Gual, 
2004; Fouquet & Johansson, 2008 etc.). From the perspective of a power generation project 
developer, there are three elements to a financial settlement5. These are: 
 
 Access - how is the settlement accessed?  
 Remuneration model - on what basis is the plant owner remunerated?  
 Deciding the level - how is the level of the remuneration determined? 
Access to the settlement can be either automatic or constrained by budget or volume limits in some 
way. A financial settlement must specify the basis on which payments will be calculated (del Río & 
Gual, 2004; Fouquet & Johansson, 2008; Kitzing et al., 2012). The classifications used here are fixed 
payments per unit of production (eg fixed feed-in tariffs), sliding payments to meet a target price 
(e.g. a contract for difference) and wholesale+: a payment in addition to the wholesale revenue, 
either from a fixed premium or the sale of a certificate6 (e.g. UK Renewables Obligation). The level of 
                                                          
5 Settlement defined here as the access to and structure of revenue from targeted policy intervention – including any 
support mechanism.  
6 The value of which is not a function of the wholesale electricity price (Couture & Gagnon, 2010) 
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the remuneration can be set administratively, through a specialist market in, for example, green 
certificates or by a process in which projects compete directly on the basis of cost to determine the 
level. 
 
<<TABLE 2>> 
Member State cases 
In order to explore the evolution of the governance of large-scale, commercial offshore wind 
development, a comparative approach is taken. Five EU Member State cases are chosen which 
account for more than 95% of all operating capacity in the EU and in which some policy innovation 
to allow for future offshore wind construction has taken place as part of a climate change mitigation 
strategy. The Member States chosen are the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, The Netherlands, 
Denmark and Belgium. The table below shows the selection of cases and their offshore wind 
deployment status. 
 
<<TABLE 1>>  
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3. Offshore wind in five EU Member States 
UK 
At the end of 2014, the UK had over 4GW of operating offshore wind capacity, more than all other 
EU Member States combined (EWEA, 2015). 
 
The British Crown owns nearly all of the UK’s territorial waters seabed and a statutory corporation 
known as The Crown Estate holds the portfolio in trust. Outside the 12 Nautical Mile (nm) limit of 
the territorial waters, The Crown Estate (TCE) has the rights to license the use of the seabed in the 
EEZ, which was designated as a “Renewable Energy Zone” in an order of 20047. TCE Corporation acts 
as seabed ‘landlord’ and seabed tenure is provided to offshore wind ‘tenants’ on a commercial basis 
(The Crown Estate, 2015b). Within areas deemed suitable by the UK’s Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA) (HM Government, 2013), TCE has run four offshore wind leasing ‘rounds’ to date 
(The Crown Estate, 2014; Toke, 2011). 
  
The early leasing rounds in 2000 and 2003 were bilateral arrangements between TCE and 
developers, with developers effectively proposing sites which TCE considered (The Crown Estate, 
2015a). In a change of approach and informed by the UK’s ongoing Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA), Round 3 saw zones offered in 2009 to developers by TCE which are “designed to 
be large enough to give developers flexibility in the location of wind farms within them” (The Crown 
Estate, 2013). 
 
There are two principal permits required to build marine renewable electricity generating stations in 
the UK: permission under Section 36 of the Electricity Act (1989) as amended by the 2004 Energy 
Act8 and a Marine License issued by the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) in England and 
Wales and Marine Scotland in Scotland. But, with the inclusion of large offshore wind projects (more 
than 100MW capacity) as ‘Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects’ in the Planning Act (2008),9 
application has been streamlined into the granting of a single Development Consent Order (DCO) 
issued by the energy Secretary. Nevertheless, project developers are still required to conduct several 
consultations exercises to obtain a DCO (HM Government, 2015). 
 
Although early UK offshore wind farm grid connections were built, owned and operated by the wind 
farm owner, starting in 200910 the UK model for connecting offshore wind farms has been known as 
the Offshore Transmission Owner (OFTO) regime (Meeus, 2014; Green & Vasilakos, 2011). The OFTO 
regime sees the rights to ownership of each connection awarded to independent transmission 
owners through competitive tenders. The early tenders required that the generator offer the 
connection to auction on completion but the so-called ‘enduring regime’ allows for both ‘generator 
build’ and an ‘OFTO build’ model. The OFTO recoups its capital by charging the wind farm for access 
(Ofgem, 2014). 
 
The decision to adopt a third-party model for offshore transmission was taken by the UK 
Government in 2007 on the grounds that it would enable a more cost-efficient offshore transmission 
system than an alternative, TSO-led model (DTI, 2007) with plans for the current competitive OFTO 
system overseen by the market regulator coming later (Ofgem, 2007).  
 
                                                          
7 (Electricity: The Renewable Energy Zone (Designation of Area) Order 2004) 
8 UK Energy Act (2004) Pt 2 Chapter 2 
9 UK Planning Act (2008) s15(3)(b) 
10 With first connections in 2011 
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In common with all other large-scale renewable generation technologies, offshore wind in the UK 
has been supported through a financial mechanism known as the Renewables Obligation (RO). The 
RO is a variant of the tradable green certificate concept which has undergone significant changes 
since implementation in 2002 but the basic premise that generators have access to revenues in 
addition to those from electricity sales remains unchanged (Woodman & Mitchell, 2011). Access to 
the RO is gained by accreditation of a project by the market regulator and all projects which meet 
the technical requirement of accreditation have access to the system (Ofgem, 2015).  
 
The main financial support system for large-scale renewables in the UK is in transition from the RO 
to a new mechanism known as Contracts for Difference (CfD) introduced under the UK 
Government’s Electricity Market Reform (EMR) programme. A CfD is a contract with a Government 
owned counterparty which guarantees the holder (generator) payments calculated as the difference 
between the agreed support level and an index of the wholesale market price for a fixed period, 15 
years in the case of offshore wind.  
 
Although the intention was to allocate CfD contracts competitively, the first offshore wind CfDs were 
awarded in 2014 to 5 projects with the strike price set administratively to maintain momentum in 
the pipeline of projects in the period of transition from the RO (DECC, 2014). The transition to 
competitive allocation of CfDs was completed in February 2015 with two offshore wind projects 
winning contracts to start operation between 2017 and 2019 in multi-technology auctions 
administered by the TSO of Great Britain, National Grid Plc (DECC, 2015). 
 
Germany 
Following a relatively slow start to offshore wind development, Germany had more than 1GW of 
installed capacity at the end of 2014 with the rate of installation increasing significantly in 2014 and 
2015 (EWEA, 2015).  
While all issues of land tenure (and permitting) in the territorial waters of Germany are the 
responsibility of the State governments (Länder), offshore wind activity in the EEZ is overseen by the 
federal authorities. Prompted in part by the need to manage the social and environmental impact of 
various uses of the sea (offshore wind in particular), in 2005, Germany’s Federal Maritime and 
Hydrographic Agency (BSH) began work on a Marine Spatial Plan (MSP) for the EEZ. Coming into 
effect in 2009, the MSP clearly identifies priority areas for offshore wind development (BSH, 2009, 
p.19).  
 
Nevertheless, offshore wind developers are entitled, under the Marine Facilities Ordinance, 1997 
(Seeanlagenverordnung, SeeAnIV11) (Article 5), to submit plans for wind farms in other areas of the 
EEZ. The BSH takes sole responsibility, under the Marine Facilities Ordinance and in consultation 
with other competent authorities, for the permitting of offshore wind projects.  
 
Although grid connection was originally the responsibility of the developer, an Act was passed in 
2006 compelling the relevant TSOs to provide grid connections (Markard & Petersen, 2009). 
Connection to the transmission grid is provided by the relevant TSO12 which is obliged under the 
                                                          
11 (Ordinance on Offshore Installations Seaward of the Limit of the German Territorial Sea (Offshore Installations 
Ordinance)) 
12 The coastal regions of Germany are covered by two TSOs, TenneT (owned by the Dutch government) in the North Sea 
and 50 hz (partly owned by the Belgian government) in the Baltic Sea. 
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Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG) or renewable energy law to provide connections at a rate of up 
to 800MW per year up to 6.5GW in 2020 (Lang, 2014).    
 
Germany has had a feed-in system for a range of renewables in place since 1991, originally 
structured as a supplement to the wholesale power price and replaced by EEG in 2000 which 
guaranteed a fixed price per unit of production for a fixed period of time (Mitchell et al., 2006) and 
extended the support to include offshore wind (EEG, 2000). In 201213 the EEG law made provision 
for ‘direct marketing’ of electricity from renewable sources which enabled a generator to sell 
directly into wholesale power markets and receive a ‘market premium’14 calculated as the difference 
between a measure of the average monthly power price and the relevant tariff (annex 4, EEG, 2012). 
In the 2012 iteration of the law a generator could switch between the tariff and direct marketing on 
a monthly basis. However, the 2014 EEG introduced ‘compulsory direct marketing’ which strictly 
limits the circumstances under which a generator qualifies for the fixed tariff, effectively mandating 
the direct marketing option. 
 
While the level of remuneration for EEG generators has long been calculated on the basis of energy 
cost estimates, the compliance with the state-aid guidelines issued by the European Commission in 
March 2014 (European Commission, 2014) means that Member States must implement competitive 
allocation of financial support by 2017. The relevant German authorities are in the process of 
developing a renewables auctions system. 
 
Netherlands 
The Netherlands currently has two operational offshore wind farms installed in 2006 and 2008 with 
a combined capacity of 228MW and a legislative act is currently in progress which aims to 
significantly reform the country’s approach to offshore wind (RVO, 2015). 
 
Spatial Planning in Dutch waters is directed by the National Water Plan (NWP) under the Water 
Management Act (Wet Beheer Rijkswaterstaatswerken, WBR). While in theory the WBR opens up 
the entire EEZ of the Netherlands to the permitting of wind farms, the available sites were restricted 
to two areas by the NWP (Government of the Netherlands, 2009). Land tenure and permission to 
build were combined in a single consent, issued and coordinated by National Water Department for 
the North Sea (Rijkswaterstaat Noordzee) with significant responsibility on the developer to pursue 
the appropriate consultations and carry out surveys. 
 
In September 2014 the Government of the Netherlands announced plans to reform their approach 
to offshore wind in order to promote rapid expansion of offshore wind in the Dutch North Sea (RVO, 
2015; Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment & Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2014). 
 
In 2015 legislation is expected to pass15 which significantly alters the approach to seabed tenure and 
development rights. Tenure will be allocated on the basis of specified wind farm sites located in 
three designated offshore wind areas. The sites tightly define the wind farm, including location, 
cable routes and the results of social and environmental surveys sufficient to meet all legal 
requirements carried out by the Government (RVO, 2015; Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment & Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2014; Loyens Loeff, 2015).  
                                                          
13 Chapter 2. Germany. Act on granting priority to renewable energy sources (Renewable Energy Sources Act – EEG). 
(2012). 
14 Generators also receive a supplement to compensate for the cost and risk of direct power market participation 
15 Offshore wind act submitted to parliament October 16, 2014 
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The Dutch TSO, TenneT, has been handed responsibility for building and operating an offshore wind 
grid with three points of connection to which offshore wind farms can connect. It is not yet clear 
whether the TSO will charge costs back to the connecting developers or pass them through 
transmission tariffs (Loyens Loeff, 2015).  
 
Since 2008, the Netherlands has supported renewable energy via its Stimulering Duurzame 
Energieproductie (SDE) program which included a specific offshore wind tariff allocated by a 
competitive tender in 2009. Relaunched in 2011 as SDE+, revenues from the policy are structured as 
a sliding premium tariff in which a generator is provided a level of support per unit production 
calculated as the difference between the target support level and a measure of the wholesale power 
price (RVO, 2014; Jansen et al., 2011) 
 
Following the reforms, licences will be revoked for offshore wind projects which were awarded 
seabed tenure under a tender in 2009 and seabed tenure, licences to build, grid connection and 
financial settlement will be awarded to the winner(s) of a competitive bidding process. 
 
Denmark 
Denmark has often been cited as a leader in the deployment of wind energy technology, both 
onshore and offshore and at the end of 2014 had five offshore wind farms larger than 100MW in 
operation accounting for nearly 90% of the 1,270MW of offshore capacity in the country (EWEA, 
2015) . 
 
The primary approach for Denmark’s offshore wind expansion is tenders to build large-scale, 
commercial wind farms on pre-determined sites. Tenders have been central to the Danish approach 
to offshore wind since the first call in 2003 (Munksgaard & Morthorst, 2008; Meyer, 2007). 
 
Sites identified through Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) are offered as a package of seabed rights, 
electricity generation licensing and an offer of a TSO-build and funded grid connection. Applications 
for are assessed on social and environmental factors before participating in a reverse auction to 
award the concession to the project bidding the lowest production cost. 
 
The development and deployment of offshore wind in Denmark is overseen by the Danish Energy 
Agency (DEA). The DEA acts as a single point of contact for nearly all consenting, permitting and 
licensing activity including the granting of seabed tenure in a so-called “one-stop-shop” approach. As 
part of the process of permitting a project, the DEA coordinates communication for necessary 
consultations between the developer and the various private and stakeholders and governmental 
bodies (DEA, 2015a, 2014; Government of Denmark, 2008). 
 
Although Danish Electricity Supply Act entitles prospective offshore wind developers to approach the 
land-tenure and development rights through an “open door” approach, the financial settlement 
available to unsolicited offshore projects is the same as that which is available to new onshore 
projects and therefore unlikely to be adequate to enable commercial investment in megaproject 
scale offshore wind16. 
 
The final price per unit of output is provided to the auction winner by the national TSO, Energinet.dk, 
in the form of a contract for difference for a fixed amount of output, an approach that has been used 
                                                          
16 Although not inconceivable – a number of projects are in the early stages of progressing through the open-door system 
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since 2005 (Kitzing et al., 2012; IEA, 2015c). In all cases, the TSO provides and maintains grid 
connections as well as taking responsibility for planning and investment in the grid more generally. 
  
  
Belgium 
Belgium has been actively pursuing offshore wind since 2004 with three large-scale, commercial 
projects with a combined capacity of over 700MW operating by the end of 2014 (EWEA, 2015) 
 
In 200417, Belgium designated seven offshore wind zones, all of which have now been allocated to 
developers (Loyens Loeff, 2014; Brabant & S. Degraer & B. Rumes, 2011). The Federal Public Service 
(FPS) for Economy reviews prospective wind farm owners’ application for rights to occupy the 
seabed in the Belgian EEZ and advises the Energy Minister who will take a decision.  
 
In order to build and operate an offshore wind farm in Belgian waters an Environmental Licence is 
required from the Minister responsible for the marine environment based on the advice of the 
Management Unit of the North Sea Mathematical Models (MUMM) under a process which was 
substantially simplified in 2003 (MUMM, 2010). 
 
All offshore wind project in Belgium to-date have been responsible for their own grid connection, 
albeit with up to one-third18 of the capital cost borne by the TSO, Elia (CREG, 2014; Loyens Loeff, 
2014). In 2013 plans were announced to begin the so-called Belgian Offshore Grid (BOG), a TSO 
funded initiative to provide ‘socket-at-sea’ connections to future offshore wind farms (CREG, 2014; 
Elia, 2015, 2013). Completion of the project was originally expected to occur by 2018 and works to 
strengthen the onshore grid began in spring 2015. Although managed by the TSO, the connection 
costs are expected to be charged on to the wind-farm developers. 
 
Regions of Belgium began implementing TGC policies in 2002 (Verbruggen, 2004) with the legal basis 
for offshore wind projects to sell certificates at a guaranteed minimum price in place from 2003 
(Loyens Loeff, 2014; IEA, 2015b; 3E, 2013). The minimum price effectively structures the 
remuneration as a fixed premium to a project’s wholesale revenues.  
 
For projects reaching financial close after May 1, 2014 the revenue structure has changed. The new 
system calculates the minimum certificate price as the difference between an average of the 
wholesale market price19 and the target minimum price (initially €138) set by Royal decree. In 
common with all other EU Members, Belgium can be expected to begin competitive allocation of 
offshore wind support by 2017 as required by the European Commission’s state-aid guidelines of 
2014. 
  
 
                                                          
17 Although the first concession was let in 2003 (Brabant & S. Degraer & B. Rumes, 2011) 
18 Up to €25m 
19 90% of the price at the APX electricity exchange 
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4.  Results and summary 
Results 
Seabed tenure 
Open door approaches to seabed tenure were the starting point in most cases but almost all 
countries have altered the way it is allocated. From 4 out of 5 offering tenure on an open door basis 
to the same proportion offering defined-sites or zones. Only Germany continues to allocate offshore 
wind seabed tenure on an open-door basis. 
<<TABLE 3>> 
Development rights 
All countries have implemented reforms to the development rights process. The reforms have all 
been quite different in approach. While some seek to relieve the developer of the burden of public 
consultation or costly studies, others are based on the ‘one-stop-shop’ principle of limiting the 
number of points of contact between a developer and public bodies. Nevertheless, all countries have 
implemented changes which increase the degree of centralisation of decision-making about offshore 
wind development rights. 
<<TABLE 4>> 
Grid connection 
Other than the UK which has a unique third-party model, all countries have moved to – or are in the 
process of moving to a TSO model for connecting offshore wind farms to onshore transmission 
systems. There is some diversity within the countries taking the TSO-led approach with Denmark and 
Germany recovering the connection cost through a levy on network users or consumers while 
Belgium and possibly the Netherlands intend to recover the cost directly from the wind farm(s) to be 
connected. The UK model does not allow for generalised cost recovery of connection costs. 
<<TABLE 5>> 
Financial settlement  
Some form of constrained allocation of support for offshore wind has been implemented in most of 
the cases. Although Germany and Belgium have not formally begun implementation of a constrained 
allocation system, the European Commission’s State Aid guidelines of 2014 suggest that such a 
system should be in place by 2017. Since 2008 all of the Member State cases have implemented 
some form of sliding premium mechanism. The means by which the level of remuneration of 
offshore wind generation is set in most cases is some kind of competitive process with Germany and 
Belgium likely following by 2017. 
<<TABLE 6>> 
<<TABLE 7>> 
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<<TABLE 8>> 
Summary 
There has been significant policy innovation leading in the governance models for offshore wind 
development in all five cases chosen. There is also some degree of convergence across all four of the 
elements of offshore wind governance. 
 
While not all cases have arrived on an identical model, a broadly ‘European’ model can be observed 
based on: 
1. designated-site or zoned seabed tenure model; 
2. targeted reform of how development rights are issued (generally in the form of more 
centralised authority); 
3. TSO-led, built or funded grid connection; and 
4. constrained allocation of sliding premium revenue support. 
 
Notable deviations from this model are the UK’s unique third-party ownership model for connecting 
offshore wind farms to the grid and Germany’s open-door approach to sea-bed tenure. 
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5. Conclusion 
The innovation in offshore wind governance described here is characterised by the participation of 
EU, national and subnational actors. Questions are raised about why the five countries analysed 
appear to be moving towards similar governance arrangements. There is evidence suggesting that 
policy diffusion between Member States - via the EU or directly between Member States - is at least 
partly responsible for the convergence. The similarity of Member States’ policy making conditions 
appears to be less important. 
One might expect policy diffusion within the EU, the very existence of which is an attempt at policy 
harmonisation between countries (Padgett, 2003; Bomberg & Peterson, 2000; Radaelli, 2000) but 
the role of EU policy varies between the four aspects of governance. In some cases the influence of 
the EU appears to be direct. The European Commission guidelines on State Aid require that 
instruments such as “auctioning or competitive bidding process(es)” are used as the primary support 
system for renewables (European Commission, 2014a, p.24). The guidelines undoubtedly have 
significant implications for the future financial settlement for renewables across Europe. But this 
explanation does nothing to account for the fact that countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands 
and possibly the UK began implementing policies to reform the way in which financial settlements 
for offshore wind were allocated and their level set more than a decade before the EU’s guidelines 
were published. One could hypothesise that one or more of these earlier innovators successfully 
‘uploaded’ their policy preferences to the EU level which were subsequently ‘downloaded’ to the 
other Member States (Padgett, 2003). More research could discover the nature and extent of 
influence.  
Another area of economic governance in which the EU plays a coordination role is the regulation of 
electricity networks. There has been innovation in the way offshore wind farms are connected to the 
onshore transmission system and in all five cases ‘generator model’ connection has been abandoned 
in favour of two alternative models possibly due to the requirements of the EU’s third electricity 
liberalisation package (Green & Vasilakos, 2011). But while the EU’s attempts to encourage 
electricity liberalisation may play a role in defining national approaches to offshore grid connection 
generally (European Commission, 2008), an interpretation of the unbundling requirements that 
negates the generator model is not universally accepted20. Also, the cost and returns to scale for 
offshore wind grid connections which can account for up to 20% of a project’s capital expense create 
a powerful functional argument at the Member State level for TSO models (European Commission, 
2008; BVG, 2010) with the UK’s third-party approach an interesting exception. 
The effect of EU policy on the granting of offshore wind development rights is less direct. The ‘maze’ 
(Wright, 2014) of organisations and laws that must be negotiated was, until recently, almost entirely 
different in each of the five countries. Some relied on legislation aimed at the electricity sector and 
others on nature conservation law, much of which derived from the EU’s Habitat’s and Birds 
Directives (Fox et al., 2006) – an example of an EU policy with a history of patchy policy convergence 
(Beunen & Duineveld, 2010). Nevertheless, all five countries have looked to greater centralisation of 
decision making authority and/or reducing the number of stakeholder voices with access to the 
process.  
                                                          
20 Sweden, for instance, maintains a ‘generator’ model for connecting offshore wind farms (SKM, 2012) 
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The EU-supported move to auctions as the primary means of allocating and setting the level of 
remuneration for offshore wind is likely to have secondary effects including greater centralisation of 
offshore wind governance. The timing and sequencing of the planning process has been shown to be 
of greater importance for the smooth functioning of auction systems than for other financial policies 
(del Río & Linares, 2014). The implication is that auction processes demand greater coordination 
between seabed tenure, the development rights process, grid connection and financial settlement. A 
reasonable expectation might be that greater coordination precipitates an increased role for central 
government agencies to manage the interactions. While Denmark and the Netherlands have 
implemented or announced a fully integrated auction system with all four elements managed within 
a single process, the other countries have only recently implemented an auction system or will do in 
the next two years.  
There are clear examples of national offshore wind policy makers working to exchange policy ideas 
directly. For example, through networking events explicitly designed for the European offshore wind 
policymaking community to meet and share experiences and know-how, led by the Government of 
Denmark but without representation of the EU institutions (DEA, 2015b). As well as direct social 
interaction, peer-to-peer diffusion may also result in emulation of apparently successful policies 
implemented elsewhere.  
Similar economic, institutional or legal conditions do not appear to predict the closeness or 
otherwise of two Member States’ offshore wind governance especially well. The UK, the most 
classically liberal market economy (LME) in the group (Hall & Soskice, 2001a), is not especially 
market-oriented in its financial settlement, innovating to make a market solution (i.e. auctions of 
sliding tariffs) central to its approach to offshore wind around the same time as Germany and well 
after Denmark and the Netherlands, all of which better fit the description of coordinated market 
economy (CME). The UK’s unique third party approach to grid connection might, however, better 
suit the expectation of an LME.  
Innovation in offshore wind seabed tenure has tended to reduce the breadth of options open to 
potential developers. The approaches appear to be largely independent of the legal and institutional 
basis on which seabed tenure is let. For example, the UK with its landlord approach for seabed 
tenure has developed a zoned-tenure model - as has Belgium, a federal state with no parallel 
institution to The Crown Estate. The influence of EU policy is also muted with very little apparent 
impact. It may be the case that Belgium and Netherlands observed and emulated the success of one 
the UK and/or Denmark which implemented zoned and single-site tenure some time ago. 
Offshore wind energy has the potential to play a significant role in the decarbonisation of the 
European economy and help tackle climate change. Approaches to the governance of offshore wind 
development in Europe are converging on a common model with the EU so far playing a number of 
roles alongside other processes. Universal implementation auctioning of offshore wind financial 
settlements may place incentives on national policy-makers to further centralise decision making 
about offshore wind in order to enable effective auctions to take place. This centralisation, 
combined with the megaproject scale of offshore wind projects puts it at odds with much of the 
discourse about the role of scale and decentralisation in efforts to tackle climate change and the 
transition to a low-carbon energy system (Wiersma & Devine-Wright, 2014). For this reason alone 
the wider political and social dimensions of offshore wind are deserving of much greater attention.   
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Member State Wind farms Turbines MW 
United Kingdom 24 1301 4494 
Germany 16 258 1045 
Netherlands 5 124 247 
Denmark 12 513 1271 
Belgium 5 182 712 
Table 1: Offshore wind deployment status in five EU Member States at the end of 2014 (EWEA, 2015) 
 
Access Remuneration model Deciding the level 
Automatic Fixed Administratively set 
Constrained Sliding Specialist market 
 Wholesale+ Competitive process 
Table 2: Options for an offshore wind financial settlement 
 Open door Zoned Tender Single site tender 
UK 2000-2009 2009-  
DE 1997-   
DK 1991-2004  2004- 
BE  2004-  
NL 2001-2015  2015- 
Table 3: Summary of approaches to seabed tenure 
 Changes resulting in more centralised development rights 
process  
UK Decision by Minister since 2008 
DE Decision by BSH since 1997 
DK All major permitting work undertaken by DEA since 2004 
BE EIA carried out by MUMM since 2003 
NL All permits administered by MEA since 2015 
Table 4: Summary of approaches to development rights21 
 
 Developer model Third Party model TSO model Cost recovery 
mechanism 
UK 2000-2007 2007-  OFTO charges 
wind farm 
DE   2006- TSO levy 
DK   2004- TSO levy 
BE 2004-  2018 TSO charges 
wind farm 
NL 2006-  2016 Unclear 
Table 5: Summary of approaches to grid connection 
 
                                                          
21 Expected or upcoming changes in italics 
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 Automatic Constrained 
UK 2002-2015 2015 
DE … 2017 
DK  2003 
BE … 2017 
NL  2009 
Table 6: Summary of approaches to financial settlement allocation 
 
 Fixed Sliding 
premium 
Wholesale + 
UK  2014- 2002-2014 
DE 2000-2014 2014- 1991-2000 
DK 1993-1999 2005- 1999-2005 
BE 2002-2015 2015-  
NL  2008-  
Table 7: Summary of approaches to financial settlement structure 
 Administrative process Certificate market Competitive process 
UK 2014-2015 2002-2014 2015- 
DE 2000-  2017 
DK 1993-2003  2003 
BE 2002-  2017 
NL   2009- 
Table 8: Summary of approaches to setting the level of the financial settlement 
 
Seabed 
Tenure 
Development rights Grid connection Financial settlement 
UK Zoned 
Centralised but 
onus on developer 
OFTO 
Constrained allocation of 
sliding premium revenue 
support 
 
DE Open door 
Centralised and 
streamlined 
TSO and levy 
DK Single site Centralised TSO and levy 
BE Zoned Centralised 
TSO charges wind 
farm 
NL Single site Centralised TSO 
Table 9: Summary of national approaches 
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